By Stockton Raso, Spring 2025 Marcellus Policy Fellow

There was a time when U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) were relatively low-key and routine operations signaling U.S. commitment to international law and the freedom of the seas. However, in the past decade, these operations in the South and East China Seas have become a topic of intense debate. The messaging from the United States has remained consistent since the program’s inception in 1979. However, some countries, particularly China, increasingly object to the notion of Freedom of Navigation.

Although there had been FONOPs in this region before, the South China Sea became a focus of the U.S. FON program from 2016 to 2023. As instances of FONOPs in the region increased, so too, did the ire drawn from the Chinese. As one analyst noted, “Chinese responses went from measured rejection of U.S. messages to the creation of Chinese counter-narratives, and ultimately to threats.” In 2015, the Chinese had zero military-grade facilities in the Spratly Islands, and today they are fielding full military bases on several islands. From this it is evident that China is not deterred by U.S. FONOPs. Instead, China uses them as a pretext for more aggressive actions and further militarization of its claims.

Furthermore, there are significant financial and personnel costs of the ships and sailors carrying out the
operational side of the program, costs that exceed the potential value gained from the exercises. The U.S. Navy truly is a global navy, and as a result, it is stretched thin across its many areas of responsibility. Every ship that is occupied doing a FONOP is one less ship for other responsibilities. The time spent performing these operations is time not spent training for more serious contingencies. As Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, noted in a Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) forum “there is a
cost” to FONOPs and it can be measured in lost time in “restoring our warfighting edge.” The benefits
of these operations do not warrant the amount of manpower and resources spent on them.

In addition to the financial and operational costs, there is a serious risk of accidents that could escalate
dangerously. Incidents such as the 2018 near collision between USS Decatur and a Chinese destroyer underscore these inherent risks, a point analyzed in greater detail later in this paper. Such close encounters are fraught with risks of miscommunication and rapid escalation. Historical precedents like the 2001 Hainan Island incident demonstrate how quickly seemingly routine encounters can escalate into broader crises, a risk even greater today given the strained U.S.-China relationship.

FONOPs as currently conducted in the South China Sea have immense costs and are counterproductive to
U.S. interests in the region. It is time to move away from dangerous and costly freedom of navigation
patrols toward a more nuanced strategy that eases tensions and decreases the risk of escalation. Such a
strategy must include an increased role for diplomacy to explore areas of compromise between the United States and China. Additionally, there should be an established process that aims to prevent maritime accidents in the first place but also addresses what will happen between the countries should there be such an event. Finally, the United States should seek to incorporate regional countries and organizations in building a more stable, inclusive maritime order with China playing a major role in such a solution.