By Alex Mazzone, Fall 2024 Marcellus Policy Fellow

The current U.S. nuclear declaratory policy is not effectively tailored to today’s strategic environment. Calculated ambiguity, or the deliberate use of ambiguous language about potential nuclear weapon use, was justified during the Cold War when the United States faced a single strategic adversary. However, the landscape has fundamentally change, with two nuclear-capable adversaries, Russia and China, who are both able to launch devastating attacks on the homeland. Strategic realities have evolved significantly since the Cold War era in ways that challenge the logic supporting calculated ambiguity’s use during that time. Additionally, the existence of three nuclear-armed superpowers strains many supposed benefits of using calculated ambiguity (e.g., ambiguous threats having a de-escalatory effect during times of rising tensions). To remedy the incompatibility of calculated ambiguity with today’s strategic environment, the United States must divide the Western nuclear deterrence mission in two dyadic relationships by offsetting responsibility of the European nuclear deterrence mission to the United Kingdom and France. This will set up U.S. nuclear strategy to capture the historical upside of calculated ambiguity while mitigating its costs in this novel strategic environment.