The collapse of Cold War-era arms control regimes and the rise of new technologies demand a fresh approach to arms control between the United States and China.  Historically, bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and later Russia have shaped U.S. arms control efforts.  However, China’s changing approach to nuclear security, resistance to participating in traditional arms control regimes, and cold relations with the United States require a new strategy.  Despite mistrust and diverging security interests, both nations have a shared interest in managing competition to reduce instability and prevent a costly arms race.  The U.S. government needs a new strategy to engage China in arms control efforts.  Behavioral Arms Control (BAC) presents a possible solution.  BAC emphasizes informality, responsibility, and multidimensionality to facilitate informal and flexible arms control engagement.  This policy paper identifies how adopting a BAC framework using unilateral declarations, engaging through multilateral declarations and fora, and enhancing coordination with U.S. allies can promote arms control initiatives with China. 

Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) stand out as a viable means to unilaterally engage China in arms control. PNIs are informal, executive-led actions that do not require Congressional approval.  New PNIs could target specific areas of Sino-American concern, such as ensuring human oversight over AI in nuclear decision-making, limiting missile deployments, or prohibiting anti-satellite weapon tests.  These measures would demonstrate U.S. intent to promote restraint and invite reciprocal action from China.  This framework enables the United States to maintain strategic flexibility should China fail to respond because of the speed and scope of implementation.  Moreover, leveraging multilateral forums, like the P5 which comprises the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, or international initiatives that focus on promoting nuclear restraint and disarmament could further constructive dialogue.  These platforms could build consensus among nuclear powers, address challenges posed by new technologies, and foster transparency in arms control practices.  Multilateral engagement provides an opportunity to integrate China into broader international disarmament efforts, facilitating technical and policy dialogue on emerging nuclear and non-nuclear threats.  Finally, U.S.-allied coordination yields another means for informal engagement.  The United States must work closely with East Asian allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to regulate the use of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNWs) and clarify conditions for their deployment to allay Chinese concerns regarding SNNW deployment in East Asia.  The United States should focus on means to further develop U.S.-allied coordination in the event of a crisis and improve mechanisms to communicate with allies to prevent miscalculation.  These developments can reassure China of U.S.-allied intentions to limit miscalculation and escalation during crises. 

While these informal approaches are not substitutes for formal, binding agreements, they serve as short-term measures to address immediate risks.  Informal mechanisms can build trust, assist in managing great power competition, and pave the way for future formal agreements.  Without proactive engagement, the United States risks an arms race with China that could erode its relative power, inflate economic spending, and diminish American security.  These policy suggestions highlight the need for novel and flexible arms control measures.  Informal arms control engagement can mitigate the worst aspects of Sino-American competition while laying the foundations for the long-term goal of comprehensive and formal arms control agreements.