By Luke R. Thompson, Fall 2025 Marcellus Policy Fellow

In American foreign policy circles, it is common to hear it suggested that 2027 is the year that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is either planning or will be ready to invade Taiwan (the Republic of China, or ROC). Such pronouncements are accompanied by significant handwringing, consternation, and calls for the United States to take a more active role in defending Taiwan. At the time of writing, April and October 2027, the months of the year in which the weather in the Taiwan Strait is most conducive to an amphibious invasion, are 18 months and two years away, respectively. If the proposed timeline were to prove prophetic, it would no doubt be sufficient cause for panic.

This panic, however, is largely misinformed and runs the risk of igniting the very crisis it is so anxious about preventing. Despite the alleged 2027 date, China has no intention of invading Taiwan any time soon. However, China could feel compelled to invade Taiwan due to actions taken by either Taiwan or the United States. Needless to say, stating that China may be compelled to invade is in no way justifying or condoning an invasion, nor does it agree with Chinese logic in regard to sovereignty over Taiwan. Rather, it is simply recognizing that the Chinese approach to the Taiwan issue is not purely formed based on internal factors. The PRC’s record of comment on this has been remarkably consistent for more than three decades, the only difference being that post-2027, China will be able to credibly back up its threats, if it does not already have this ability. After 2027, any invasion by the Chinese will still be incredibly risky, and China stands to suffer significantly long-term, even if it successfully takes Taiwan by force.

The United States has a clear interest in preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait and avoiding conflict should war break out. As such, the United States must maintain strategic ambiguity, communicating to China the severe consequences short of war that it will face should it decide to act unilaterally, while at the same time clarifying the limits of American support to Taiwan and being strategic about continued arms sales. In the long-term, the United States should push for deep reforms to the Taiwanese military with the goal of making it better able to defend itself without U.S. assistance.